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CREDIT RISK DRIVERS: EVALUATING THE CONTRIBUTION




Banks and other fi  nan  cial in  ter  me  di  ar  ies try to maxi  mise their prof  its, which re  quires an ac  cu  rate pric  -
ing of the risks con  tained in their as  sets port  fo  lios. Thereby, given the weight loans to firms have on
banks’ as  sets, un  der  stand  ing why do some firms de  fault, while oth  ers do not, may be a very im  por  tant
ques  tion to ad  dress. More  over, from a fi  nan  cial sta  bil  ity view  point, it is in  ter  est  ing to un  der  stand if
credit de fault risk is mostly driven by id  io  syn  cratic fac tors (which may al  low for the iden  ti fi ca  tion of a set 
of  char ac ter is tics  com mon  to  risk ier  firms)  or  by  sys tem atic  fac tors,  which  si mul ta neously  af fect  all
firms (thus hav  ing more wide  spread im  pacts on fi  nan  cial sta  bil  ity, given that sev  eral banks can suf  fer
size  able losses in their credit port  fo  lios at the same time). On one hand, firm-spe  cific char  ac  ter  is  tics
should clearly be de  ter  mi  nant on their de  ci  sion to de  fault on bank loans. On the other hand, it has be  -
come clearer that mac  ro  eco  nomic de  vel  op  ments may also have an im  por  tant role in the evo  lu  tion of
credit risk over time. The em  pir  i  cal re  sults ob  tained in the lit  er  a  ture sug  gest that there are some im  por  -
tant links be  tween credit risk and mac  ro  eco  nomic de  vel  op  ments (see, for in  stance, Pederzoli and
Torricelli (2005), Jiménez and Saurina (2006) or Bonfim (2007)). In fact, pe  ri  ods of strong eco  nomic
growth, which are some  times ac  com  pa  nied by ro  bust credit growth, are some  times fol  lowed, with
some lag, by an increase in default rates at the aggregate level, possibly as a consequence of
imbalances generated in those periods.
Un  der this setup, the main pur  pose of this ar  ti  cle is to em  pir  i  cally ex  am  ine the de  ter  mi  nants of cor  po  -
rate credit de  fault in loans granted by the Por  tu  guese bank  ing sys  tem, tak  ing si  mul  ta  neously into ac  -
count  firm-spe cific  data  as  well  as  mac ro eco nomic  in for ma tion.  Us ing  mi cro  in for ma tion,  which
in  cludes very de  tailed firm-level data, it be  comes clear that the firms’ fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion will in  flu  ence
the  prob a bil ity  of  de fault  on  their  loan  com mit ments.  Prof it abil ity,  li quid ity,  sol vency  and  re cent  in vest -
ment  and  sales  per for mance  seem  to  of fer  a  valu able  con tri bu tion  in  ex plain ing  de fault  prob a bil i ties.
When time-ef  fect con  trols or mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  ables are taken into ac  count to  gether with the
firm-spe  cific in  for  ma  tion, the re  sults of the mod  els seem to im  prove con  sid  er  ably. Hence, the re  sults
ob  tained with this work sug gest that even though the de  ter  mi  nants of loan de  fault at the mi cro level are
ul  ti  mately driven by the firms’ spe  cific fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion, there are important relationships between
overall macroeconomic conditions and default probabilities over time.
The re  main  der of the pa  per pro  ceeds as fol  lows. Section 2 de  scribes the main datasets used in this
work, which in  clude in  for  ma  tion for more than 30.000 Por  tu  guese firms. In Section 3 we pres  ent some
sum mary  sta tis tics  which  are  rel e vant  for  the  char ac teri sa tion  of  the  sam ple.  Af ter wards,  in  Section 4
we briefly pres  ent the mod  el  ling setup un  der  ly  ing the em  pir  i  cal work which will be de  vel  oped in
Financial Stability Report 2006 | Banco de Por  tu  gal
Articles | Part II
147
* The analysis, opinions and findings in this article represent the views of the author and are not necessarily those of the Banco de Portugal. The author is
grateful to Paula Antão, Paulo Soares Pinho, António Antunes, Nuno Ribeiro, Pedro Portugal, Mário Centeno, Ana Cristina Leal and Nuno Alves for their
helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors and omissions are the author’s responsibility.
** Economics and Research Department, Banco de Portugal.Sections 5 and 6, which pres  ent, re  spec  tively, the re  sults ob  tained us  ing dis  crete choice mod  els and
du ra tion  mod els.  Fi nally,  in  Section 7 we present some concluding remarks.
2. DATA
The mi  cro  ec  o  nomic dataset used in this work com  prises two dis  tinct datasets held by Banco de Por  tu  -
gal, namely, the Cen  tral Credit Reg  is  ter and the Cen  tral Bal  ance Sheet Da  ta  base. The Cen  tral Credit
Reg  is  ter pro  vides in  for  ma  tion on all credit ex  po  sures above 50 euro in Por  tu  gal. The in  for  ma  tion con  -
tained in this da  ta  base is re  ported by credit in  sti  tu  tions (re  port  ing is man  da  tory) and its main ob  jec  tive
is  shar ing  in for ma tion  be tween  par tic i pant  in sti tu tions,  in  or der  to  im prove  their  credit  risk  as sess ment
and man  age  ment. This da  ta  base con  tains monthly in  for  ma  tion on loans granted to firms and house  -
holds, in  clud  ing their cur  rent sta  tus (it is pos  si  ble to know whether credit has be  come over  due, if it was
re  ne  go  ti  ated, or if it is an off-bal  ance sheet risk, such as the un  used parts of credit lines or bank guar  -
an tees).
1 Us  ing end-o  f-year data for the pe  riod be  tween 1996 and 2002, there are 203.655 ob  ser  va  -
tions  re gard ing  loans  granted  to  non-fi nan cial  cor po ra tions.
2 In turn, the Cen  tral Bal  ance Sheet
Da  ta  base con  tains de  tailed ac  count  ing data on a large sam  ple of Por  tu  guese firms, be  ing used mostly
for  sta tis ti cal  and  eco nomic  anal y sis  pur poses.
3 Re  port  ing by firms in this da  ta  base is not com  pul  sory.
The sam  ple of firms cov  ers to an ac  cept  able de  gree the Por  tu  guese uni  verse, al  though some bias
may ex  ist to  wards larger firms, which are al  most to  tally cov  ered.
4 In this dataset there are 153.581 an  -
nual ob  ser  va  tions for the period between 1996 and 2002. By merging the two datasets there are
113.119 observations, which regard 33.084 different firms.
We con  structed sev  eral ra  tios and in  di  ca  tors to eval  u  ate firms’ fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion, namely in what con  -
cerns  their  prof it abil ity,  fi nan cial  struc ture,  le ver age,  pro duc tiv ity,  li quid ity  and  in vest ment.  In  or der  to
guar  an  tee the qual  ity of re  sults, sev  eral fil  ters were ap  plied to the data. First, ra  tios for which the de  -
nom  i  na  tor equalled (or was close to) zero, as well as ra  tios for which a neg  a  tive nu  mer  a  tor was com  -
bined with a neg  a  tive de  nom  i  na  tor (lead  ing to ra  tios with a pos  i  tive sign), were elim  i  nated from the
anal  y  sis, in or  der to avoid mis  lead  ing re  sults. More  over, in or  der to pre  vent out  li  ers from dis  tort  ing the
anal y sis,  ob ser va tions  be low  the  1
st per  cen  tile and above the 99
th percentile were replaced with the
value of the corresponding percentile.
3. CHARACTERISATION OF FIRMS IN DEFAULT
Only a small per  cent  age of firms in the sam  ple has credit over  due (around 3 per cent of firms). The
higher de  fault rates are re  corded in fish  ing, min  ing, tour  ism and res  tau  rants and man  u  fac  tur  ing (Ta  ble
1). With re  gard to the size of firms, the high  est de  fault fre  quen  cies are re  corded by me  dium-sized
firms, closely fol  lowed by larger firms, con  trary to what is usu  ally seen in the lit  er  a  ture. For in  stance,
Bhattacharjee et al. (2002), Bunn and Red  wood (2003), Eklund et al . (2001) and Jiménez and Saurina 
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(1) The main purposes and features of the Central Credit Register of Banco de Portugal are described in
 http://www.bportugal.pt/internet/prod/publish/cadernos/responsabilidades_credito_e.pdf.
(2) Reporting credit institutions aggregate information on loans with similar status for each firm (i.e. information is not reported on a loan-by-loan basis). In order
to merge the two datasets used in this article, the CRC records were aggregated within firms. As a consequence, each observation is defined as a pair
firm-year, summing up all credit liabilities for a given firm in each year.
(3) The main purposes and features of the Central Balance Sheet Database of Banco de Portugal are described in
 http://www.bportugal.pt/internet/prod/publish/cadernos/central_balancos_e.pdf.
(4) In 2005 firms included in the Central Balance Sheet Database accounted for around 61 per cent of the gross value added of the Portuguese economy and
for around 35 per cent of the total size of the workforce in Portugal. However, while for large enterprises coverage stood at around 82 per cent of the size of
the workforce, for small and medium-sized enterprises this coverage stood at around 20 per cent. For more details on the coverage of this database,
seeTable G.1.2 of the Statistical Bulletin of Banco de Portugal.(2004) find that smaller firms are more likely to de  fault.
5 In turn, Pain and Vesala (2004) and
Bernhardsen (2001) con clude that any sys temic ef  fect of firm size on de fault is rel a  tively small, par  tic u  -
larly  af ter  con trol ling  for  firm’s  char ac ter is tics.
6 Such re  sults im  ply that two firms with very sim  i  lar fi  nan  -
cial  in di ca tors  are  not  likely  to  pres ent  sig nif i cantly  dif fer ent  de fault  prob a bil i ties,  even  if  they  have
con sid er ably  dif fer ent  sizes.  Fi nally,  Benito  et al. (2004), us  ing a sam  ple of Span  ish firms, ob  tain a re  -
sult sim  i  lar to ours, ob  serv  ing a pos  i  tive re  la  tion  ship be  tween firm size and de  fault rates. The au  thors
ar  gue that their da  ta  base may be bi  ased to  wards “good” com  pa  nies, which may also be a prob  lem in
our da ta  base, given that re port ing to the Cen tral Bal  ance Sheet Da ta  base is not man  da  tory (and there -
fore the re  sponse rate by firms un  der strong fi  nan  cial pres  sure is ex  pected to be rel  a  tively lower).
7
Tak  ing into ac  count that one of the main pur  poses of this ar  ti  cle is to un  der  stand what drives credit risk
at the firm-level, it may be rel  e  vant to com  pare some fea  tures of firms with and with  out de  fault. Ta  ble 2
pres  ents some of the main re  sults ob  tained, show  ing that, in fact, there are sev  eral as  pects that dis  tin  -
guish firms in de  fault. For in  stance, av  er  age prof  it  abil  ity levels in these firms are much lower, sales
growth is far lower, and the de  pend  ence on ex  ter  nal fund  ing sources (sol  vency ra  tio, de  fined as the ra  -
tio be  tween eq  uity and to  tal as  sets) seems to be sig  nif  i  cantly higher. More  over, firms with prob  lems in
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Table 1
DEFAULT FREQUENCIES BY FIRM SECTOR AND SIZE 
By sector of activity
No of obs. Default rate (%)
Fishing 277 11.19
Mining 1 084 5.17
Agriculture 3 487 2.81
Manufacturing 41 427 3.76
Utilities 355 1.97
Construction 14 020 3.25
Commerce 31 793 1.83
Tourism and restaurants 1 405 4.70
Transportation and communications 6 004 2.60




No of obs. Default rate (%)
Micro 39 725 2.67
Small 42 608 2.72
Medium 16 548 4.21
Large 4 320 3.89
Note: The size of en  ter  prises was de  fined ac  cord  ing to Com  mis  sion Rec  om  men  da  tion of 6 May 2003 (2003/631/EC), tak  ing into ac  count the num  ber of em  ploy  ees and sales and ser  -
vices turnover.
(5) Bhattacharjee et al. (2002) and Bunn and Red wood (2003) use sam ples of firms from the United King dom, Eklund et al. (2001) use a da ta base of Nor we gian 
firms and, fi  nally, Jiménez and Saurina (2004) use Banco de España da  ta  bases sim  i  lar to those used in this ar  ti  cle. 5555555
(6) The above-mentioned studies use a database comprising European firms and Norwegian firms respectively.
(7) Antunes et al. (2005) con  clude that de  fault rates tend to be lower for firms with more credit, on the ba sis of avail able in for ma tion in Cen tral Credit Reg is ter,
which con  trib  utes to strengthen the hy  poth  e  sis that small en  ter  prises in fi  nan  cial dis  tress should be sub-rep  re  sented in the Cen  tral Bal  ance Sheet
Da ta base. 7777777pay  ing their debt also have, on av  er  age, lower in  vest  ment rates, as well as less fa  vour  able li  quid  ity in  -
di  ca  tors. The Welch test makes it pos  si  ble to de  ter  mine whether mean val  ues in these two groups of
firms are sig  nif  i  cantly dif  fer  ent. The re  sults of this sta  tis  ti  cal test con  firm that all mean val  ues for firms
in de  fault are statistically different from mean values for the remaining firms.
The em  pir  i  cal dis  tri  bu  tion of the de  fault ra  tio of firms in  cluded in the sam  ple is clearly two-peaked: ei  -
ther firms re  cord only small amounts of credit over  due, which should re  flect tran  si  tory ep  i  sodes of de  -
lin  quency, or they de  fault on nearly all their debt, which should be a sit  u  a  tion closer to bank  ruptcy
(Chart 1). It may be in  ter est ing to no  tice that the for  mer is par  tic u  larly fre  quent for larger firms, whereas 
the lat ter mostly re  spects to smaller firms. In this sense, al though larger firms have rel a  tively higher de -
fault fre  quen  cies, de  fault ep  i  sodes re  corded by these firms usually have a very small magnitude.
By  es ti mat ing  con di tional  tran si tion  ma tri ces,  it  is  pos si ble  to  as sess  de fault  prob a bil i ties  for  dif fer ent
time  ho ri zons  (t+1, t+2,…). These ma  tri  ces sug  gest that for firms with no pre  vi  ous de  fault ep  i  sodes,
de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties in  crease steadily over time. In turn, for firms that have re  corded some de  fault ep  i  -
sode, de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties are al  ways far higher than those of firms that have never had prob  lems in
pay  ing their debt com  mit  ments. This im  plies that firms with a past re  cord of credit over  due are more
likely to de  fault again in the future than firms that never defaulted before.
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Table 2
SUMMARY STATISTICS – COMPARISON OF FIRMS WITH AND WITHOUT DEFAULTS













ROA 0.5 -4.9 0.00 Y
Sales growth 12.9 5.7 0.00 Y
Solvency ratio 23.2 1.1 0.00 Y
Total credit as a % of assets 12.5 16.9 0.00 Y
Leverage 76.8 98.9 0.00 Y
Investment rate 2.6 -2.5 0.00 Y
Liquidity ratio 119.0 86.5 0.00 Y
Number of observations 100 117 3 084
Note: ROA (re turn on as sets) de fined as net in come as a per cent age of as sets; Sales growth de fined as the year-on-year rate of change in sales and ser vices; sol vency ra tio as sessed by
the ra tio of eq uity to as sets; to tal credit re  fers to to tal debt re corded at Cen tral Credit Reg is ter for each firm; le ver age is de fined as the ra tio of the firm’s li  a bil i ties to as sets; the in vest ment
rate re  fers to the an  nual change in net fixed as  sets as a per  cent  age of sales and ser  vices pro  vided; fi  nally, the li  quid  ity ra  tio as  sesses the amount re  corded un  der cash and de  pos  its,
third-party debt, in  ven  to  ries and mar  ket  able securities as a percentage of third-party debt.Financial Stability Report 2006 | Banco de Por  tu  gal
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Chart 1





























































































of firm defaults in
otherwise
The de  fault prob  a  bil  ity would thus be de  fined as:
( ) ( ) lit it it it Y R c = = = £ Pr Pr 1
where Rit rep  re  sents the re  turn on a firm’s as  sets. Thus, a firm is likely to de  fault if its re  turns fall be  low
a given thresh  old cit.
In this ar  ti  cle two types of ex  plan  a  tory vari  ables are con  sid  ered. The first one is a set of firm-spe  cific
vari  ables, which shall ac  count for id  io  syn  cratic risk (Zit). The sec  ond vec  tor com  prises a set of ag  gre  -
gate time-vary  ing regressors, com mon to all firms, which in tend to ac  count for the sys  tem atic risk com -
po nent  (Xt). If we con  sider that the firm’s re  turns may be de  fined through a lin  ear com  bi  na  tion of these
vectors, the following applies:
( ) ( ) ( ) l a g d a g it it it it t it it it Y R c X Z u c F X = = = £ = + + + £ = + Pr Pr Pr ~ ~ 1 ( ) t it Z + ~ d
where F(.)  de notes  the  cu mu la tive  dis tri bu tion  func tion  of  the  re sid ual.  This  model’s  pa ram e ters  may
be es  ti  mated us  ing a dis  crete choice model, namely a probit or a logit. The use of this type of ec  ono  -
met  ric model is rel  a  tively com  mon in the lit  er  a  ture on credit risk, and there  fore this will the
 methodology ini tially used in this ar ti cle for the ec ono met ric es ti ma tion of factors driving loan default.
How  ever, it may be rel  e  vant to un  der  stand not only if a firm will de  fault, but also when will that de  fault
even  tu  ally oc  cur. The tim  ing of loan de  fault is im  por  tant for per  form a com  plete risk as  sess  ment, as
well as for ac  cu  rate loan pric  ing and provisioning. Du  ra  tion mod  els, which only re  cently started to be
ap  plied to credit risk mod  els, di  rectly model the sur  vival time of a loan, tak  ing as a de  pend  ent vari  able
the time un  til de  fault.
8
Un der  the  du ra tion  mod el ling  frame work,  we  de fine  T as the time un  til a loan de  faults
9. The haz  ard
func  tion can be de  fined as the prob  a  bil  ity of a firm de  fault  ing within the in  fi  nitely short in  ter  val [t, t+dt),
con  di  tional on not hav  ing defaulted before:
( ) ( )
h t
t T t dt T t
dt dt =




The  du ra tion  dis tri bu tion  func tion  can  be  de fined  as  F(t)=Pr (T < t ). The sur  vival func  tion is the prob  a  -
bil  ity of sur  viv  ing up to t, and can be defined as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) S t T t F t h s d s
t






þ ò Pr exp 1
0
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(8) For examples of studies applying this econometric estimation technique to credit risk models, see Banasik et al. (1999), Car ling et al. (2007), Couderc and
Renault (2005) or Shumway (2001). 8888888
(9) Lancaster (1990) presents a detailed and rigorous description of several issues associated with duration models.When ever  T  has  an  ex po nen tial  dis tri bu tion,  the  haz ard  func tion  h(t) is con  stant. When that is not ob  -




> 0, there is pos  i  tive
du  ra  tion de  pend  ence, which im  plies that, in our frame  work, the prob  a  bil  ity of de  fault in  creases over
the life of the firm. Oth  er  wise, du  ra  tion de  pend  ence should be neg  a  tive, im  ply  ing that the lon  ger the
firm has re  mained with  out de  fault  ing, the lower should be its default probability.
5. MAIN ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OBTAINED USING DISCRETE CHOICE
MODELS
Ta  ble 3 pres  ents some of the main re  sults ob  tained us  ing dis  crete choice mod  els, based on a ran  -
dom-ef  fects probit model.
10 The choice of vari  ables to be used was based on the es  ti  ma  tion of cor  re  la  -
tion ma  tri  ces be  tween the set of avail  able vari  ables, as well as on the abovementioned mean
com par i son  sta tis ti cal  tests.  The  first  model  in cludes  a  rel a tively  di ver si fied  set  of  vari ables,  which
broadly  char ac ter ises  firms’  fi nan cial  sit u a tion.  Sales  growth  dis plays  a  neg a tive  co ef fi cient,  sug gest -
ing that firms with stron  ger sales growth rates should have lower de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties. Prof  it  abil  ity
seems to of  fer an im  por  tant con  tri  bu  tion in ex  plain  ing why do some firms de  fault, given that higher
prof  it  abil  ity levels should re  flect a solid fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion of the firm and, as a con  se  quence, im  ply
lower de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties. The sol  vency ra  tio, which is de  fined as the ra  tio be  tween eq  uity and to  tal
as sets, also sug gests that firms with health  ier fi nan  cial con di  tions should have rel a  tively low credit risk. 
More  over, firms with high in  vest  ment rates are also likely to have lower de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties. In fact, it
seems rea  son  able to ad  mit that firms un  der strong fi  nan  cial pres  sure are not ex  pected to en  gage in in  -
vest  ment pro  jects. Fi  nally, the li  quid  ity in  di  ca  tor, de  fined as short-term as  sets as a per  cent  age of the
firm’s to  tal debt, also dis  plays a neg  a  tive coefficient, implying that firms facing stronger liquidity
constraints may have higher difficulties in paying their debt commitments.
Even though the firm-spe  cific vari  ables taken into ac  count seem to play an im  por  tant role in pre  dict  ing
loan de  fault for the firms in  cluded in this sam  ple, they should be seen as con  tin  gent on the firm’s size,
as well as on the sec  tor in which it op  er  ates, given that some vari  ables may be more or less im  por  tant
for dif  fer  ent types of firms. In or  der to con  trol for spe  cific ef  fects as  so  ci  ated with such firm char  ac  ter  is  -
tics, all the re  gres  sions pre  sented in this ar  ti  cle in  clude eco  nomic sec  tor and firm size dum  mies as
con  trol vari  ables. Re  sults sug  gest that there are in  deed sub  stan  tial dif  fer  ences in the de  ter  mi  nants of
de fault  prob a bil i ties  in  var i ous  sec tors  (the  es ti ma tion  of  sep a rate  re gres sions  for  each  eco nomic  sec -
tor in the sam  ple con  firms this hy  poth  e  sis). Es  ti  mated mod  els con  firm that fish  ing and min  ing firms will
tend to have higher de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties, as shown in Ta  ble 1. With re  gard to the in  clu  sion of con  trol
vari  ables for firm size, the re  sults are not so clear. De  scrip  tive sta  tis  tics for the en  tire sam  ple sug  -
gested that smaller firms show slightly lower de  fault rates than larger firms, which is not con  sis  tent with 
the re  sults usu  ally ob  tained in the lit  er  a  ture on credit risk mod  el  ling.
11  Es ti mated  re gres sions  con firm
this  re sult,  al though  dif fer ences  be tween  firms  with  dif fer ent  di men sions  are  not  sta tis ti cally sig nif i cant. 
This re  sult im  plies that, al  though larger firms dis  play slightly higher de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties, af  ter con  trol  -
ling for sev  eral firm char  ac  ter  is  tics, firm size does not have a sta  tis  ti  cally sig  nif  i  cant ef  fect on de  fault
prob a bil i ties.  As  a  con se quence,  two  firms  with  sim i lar  fi nan cial  char ac ter is tics  should  pres ent  iden ti -
cal de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties, even if they have very dif  fer  ent sizes. Fi  nally, given that mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  -
ables will only be in  tro  duced fur  ther ahead, year dum  mies were also in  cluded as con  trol vari  ables, in
or  der to con  trol for any pos  si  ble sys  tem  atic ef  fects. Most coefficients associated with these year
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(10) Results presented in this section are a brief summary of those presented in Bonfim (2007).
(11) This result may be conditioned by the sample bias towards firms with better credit quality, which should be over-represented, as discussed in Section 3.Banco de Por  tu  gal | Fi nan cial  Sta bil ity  Re port  2006
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Table 3
PROBIT REGRESSIONS (DEPENDENT VARIABLE: DUMMY CREDIT OVERDUE)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Sales growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
-2.19 -2.20 -2.16 -2.52 -1.97 -0.47
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
-3.96 -3.95 -3.92 -3.97 -3.66 -4.05
Solvency ratio -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
-7.56 -7.35 -7.36 -11.24 -11.09 -11.87
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
-5.01 -4.99 -4.99 -4.52 -5.18




Share of tangible fixed assets -0.002
-1.49




Small -0.044 -0.035 -0.035 -0.044 -0.034
-0.52 -0.41 -0.42 -0.53 -0.41
Micro -0.013 -0.001 -0.011 -0.025 -0.059
-0.15 -0.01 -0.13 -0.29 -0.69
Medium-sized -0.026 -0.022 -0.015 -0.023 -0.005
-0.30 -0.25 -0.17 -0.27 -0.06
Fishing  0.358 0.363 0.360 0.431 0.369 0.234
1.42 1.45 1.43 1.74 1.46 0.93
Mining 0.222 0.223 0.224 0.240 0.228 0.148
1.57 1.57 1.58 1.71 1.60 1.05
Agriculture  -0.191 -0.195 -0.194 -0.182 -0.194 -0.306
-1.95 -1.98 -1.96 -1.85 -1.94 -3.07
Utilities -0.492 -0.500 -0.492 -0.446 -0.473 -0.622
-1.34 -1.36 -1.34 -1.26 -1.29 -1.70
Construction 0.040 0.039 0.041 0.019 0.035 -0.027
0.81 0.78 0.82 0.37 0.67 -0.54
Commerce -0.329 -0.332 -0.332 -0.356 -0.337 -0.199
-7.34 -7.26 -7.25 -7.78 -7.09 -4.34
Tourism and restaurants -0.151 -0.152 -0.154 -0.107 -0.152 -0.177
-1.03 -1.04 -1.05 -0.75 -1.02 -1.21
Transportation and communications -0.019 -0.023 -0.023 -0.027 -0.030 0.052
-0.26 -0.32 -0.32 -0.38 -0.41 0.73
Real estate activities -0.496 -0.502 -0.499 -0.535 -0.505 -0.585
-3.28 -3.32 -3.29 -3.60 -3.36 -3.91
Education 0.194 0.190 0.193 0.189 0.190 0.166
0.65 0.64 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.55
Healthcare -0.286 -0.287 -0.284 -0.266 -0.277 -0.253
-0.91 -0.92 -0.91 -0.86 -0.88 -0.81
1997 -0.303 -0.303 -0.302 -0.312 -0.313 -0.284
-5.61 -5.59 -5.56 -5.76 -5.76 -5.25
1998 -0.229 -0.230 -0.228 -0.236 -0.235 -0.206
-4.55 -4.55 -4.50 -4.68 -4.65 -4.09
1999 -0.340 -0.341 -0.339 -0.343 -0.342 -0.329
-6.38 -6.37 -6.34 -6.44 -6.39 -6.15
2000 -0.390 -0.390 -0.390 -0.391 -0.393 -0.391
-6.51 -6.51 -6.51 -6.56 -6.56 -6.50
2002 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.011 0.002 -0.013
0.12 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.05 -0.26
Constant -2.184 -2.153 -2.175 -2.048 -2.304 -1.907
-29.42 -20.17 -19.27 -11.85 -21.12 -18.61
Number of observations 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 078 71 078 71 406
Number of firms 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 589 24 589 24 731
Pseudo-R
2 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.051 0.062
Wald Chi
2 346.3 347.0 346.7 338.1 345.8 412.5
Prob > Chi
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.397 0.396 0.396 0.392 0.399 0.389
Prob >= chibar
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: z-scores in ital ics. All mod els es ti mated us ing a ran dom-ef fects probit es ti ma tor, where the de pend ent vari able is the dummy credit over due. Co ef fi cients re fer to mar ginal ef fects. In 
what con  cerns size, sec tor and year dum  mies, the omit ted vari ables were large en  ter  prises, man  u fac  tur  ing firms and 2001 re spec  tively. The pseudo-R2 is a mea sure of the good  ness of
the fit. The Wald test eval  u  ates the over  all sta  tis  ti  cal sig  nif  i  cance of the es  ti  mated co  ef  fi  cients. Fi  nally, rho as  sesses the pro  por  tion of the to  tal vari  ance resulting from the panel-level
variance component.dummies are significant, which gives support to the hypothesis that macroeconomic developments
should also be important in explaining loan default.
In ad  di  tion to the vari  ables used in the first model (sales growth, re  turn on as  sets, sol  vency ra  tio, in  -
vest ment  rate  and  li quid ity  in di ca tor),  other  pos si ble  spec i fi ca tions  were  con sid ered,  which  are  also
shown  in  Ta ble  3.  Firm  age  is  not  a  sta tis ti cally  sig nif i cant  vari able  for  de ter min ing  de fault  prob a bil i ties.
An  other vari  able con  sid  ered was the share of tan  gi  ble as  sets on firms’ to  tal non-fi  nan  cial fixed as  sets.
This vari  able dis  plays a neg  a  tive co  ef  fi  cient, im  ply  ing that the higher the share of tan  gi  ble as  sets, the
lower is the de  fault prob  a  bil  ity, af  ter con  trol  ling for the firm’s eco  nomic sec  tor. Nev  er  the  less, the es  ti  -
mated co  ef  fi  cient for this vari  able is hardly sta  tis  ti  cally sig  nif  i  cant. Given that the da  ta  base does not
pro  vide in  for  ma  tion on the col  lat  eral used to guar  an  tee loans, we tried to build an ap  prox  i  mate mea  -
sure of to  tal avail  able col  lat  eral (tan  gi  ble as  sets as a per  cent  age of to  tal as  sets), but it did not prove to
be sig  nif  i  cant in the es  ti  mated re  gres  sion mod  els. Turn  over ra  tios, de  fined as sales over as  sets, also
seem to have a rel  a  tively sig  nif  i  cant ex  plan  a  tory power and show a neg  a  tive sign. This vari  able con  -
firms the ev  i  dence pre  sented by sales growth (which is not sig  nif  i  cant in this spec  i  fi  ca  tion, given the
strong cor  re  la  tions between the two variables), suggesting that the current buoyancy of firm activity is
an important signal of its financial soundness.
The dif  fer  ent model spec  i  fi  ca  tions out  lined in Ta  ble 3 help to iden  tify some of the firm-spe  cific de  ter  mi  -
nants of loan de  fault in a given mo  ment of time. How  ever, it should also be of in  ter  est to eval  u  ate how
the firm’s past per for mance af  fects its cur rent de fault prob a bil ity. Such in for ma tion may help to im prove 
the abil ity to fore cast de fault prob  a  bil  i  ties, given that it helps to better un  der  stand to what ex  tent the de  -
te  ri  o  ra  tion of some fi  nan  cial in  di  ca  tors may im  ply an in  crease in the firm’s credit risk in the near fu  ture.
More  over, un  der  stand  ing such dy  namic re  la  tion  ships is also im  por  tant due to the time lag usu  ally as  -
so  ci  ated with the re  lease of ac  count  ing data, par  tic  u  larly for non-quoted firms, which may ham  per the
mon  i  tor  ing of credit risk de  vel  op  ments over time. In this sense, Ta  ble 4 shows the base  line model de  -
fined in Ta ble 3 with ex plan a tory vari ables lagged by one, two, three and four years, re spec tively. When 
all firm vari  ables are lagged by one and two years, the re  sults are mainly ro  bust. Ob  tain  ing this re  sult is
very  im por tant,  given  that  it  im plies  that  vari ables  iden ti fied  as  par tic u larly  rel e vant  for  de ter min ing  the
cur  rent risk of the firm also make it pos  si  ble to de  tect in ad  vance pos  si  ble fi  nan  cial dif  fi  cul  ties in a ho  ri  -
zon of up to two years. The most no  ta  ble ex  cep  tion is the in  vest  ment rate, which ceases to be sig  nif  i  -
cant when lagged. More  over, the es  ti  mated co  ef  fi  cient for sales growth is not sta  tis  ti  cally sig  nif  i  cant
when more than two lags are con  sid  ered, sug gest  ing that only the most re  cent sales per  for  mance truly
con di tions firms’ de fault prob a bil i ties. There seems to be an in crease in the mar ginal ef fect of prof it  abil -
ity on credit risk, and, con  versely, a de  crease in the rel  a  tive im  por  tance of the sol  vency ra  tio. Hence,
sus  tained poor prof  it  abil  ity ra  tios over time are a strong sign of firm dis  tress, yield  ing pos  si  bly high fu  -
ture de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties. When vari  ables are lagged by three or four years there is a clear de  crease in
the model’s qual  ity (most vari  ables are no lon  ger sig  nif  i  cant and the model’s good  ness of fit, as  sessed
by the pseudo-R2, de  creases con  sid  er  ably),
12 suggesting that the firm’s recent performance is, as
expected, much more relevant to explain loan default than its historical background over a longer
horizon.
In ad  di  tion, we also con  sid  ered si  mul  ta  neously sev  eral time lags, in or  der to cap  ture in a more in  te  -
grated man  ner the dy  namic ef  fect of the firm’s fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion on credit risk. Over  all, the re  sults are
con  sis  tent with those pre  vi  ously de  scribed, as in both cases only one and two year lags turn out to be
sta tis ti cally  sig nif i cant.  The  re sults  con firm  that  prof it abil ity  seems  to  have  the  high est  lagged  ex plan a -
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0 , where p0 is the log-likelihood of the constant-only model ( ) Yit = a ,
and  p is the log-likelihood of the estimated regression. This ratio is a measure of the percentage of the variance on the dependent variable that is captured
by the model. 121212121212tory power, though the li quid ity and sol  vency ra  tios also pro vide in ter est ing in for ma tion when lagged by 
one year. Again, the in  vest  ment rate fails to be significant when lagged.
As  men tioned  in  the  be gin ning  of  this  ar ti cle,  em pir i cal  ev i dence  sug gests  that  de vel op ments  in  de fault 
prob a bil i ties  over  time  should  be  largely  as so ci ated  with  cy cli cal  fluc tu a tions  of  the  eco nomic  ac tiv ity.
In this sense, it may be in  ter  est  ing to as  sess the con  tri  bu  tion of firms’ spe  cific char  ac  ter  is  tics and of
mac ro eco nomic  and  fi nan cial  con di tions,  by  in tro duc ing  mac ro eco nomic  vari ables  in  panel  data  re -
gres  sions, as an al  ter na  tive to sim  ple time ef  fects con  trols. The most in sight  ful re sults are pre  sented in 
Ta  ble 5. From all the vari  ables con  sid  ered, the most im  por  tant seem to be the GDP growth rate or the
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Note: z-scores in ital  ics. All re  gres  sions in  clude the con  trol dum  mies for size, sec  tor and year pre  sented in Ta  ble 3. All mod  els es  ti  mated us  ing a ran  dom-ef  fects probit es  ti  ma  tor, where
the de pend ent vari able is the dummy credit over due. Co ef fi cients re fer to mar ginal ef fects. The pseudo-R2 is a mea sure of the good ness of the fit. The Wald test eval u ates the over all sta -




spec i fi ca tion
All firm variables lagged by: Models with several
simultaneous lags
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years
Sales growth t -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.003




ROA t -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003





Solvency ratio t -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007





Investment rate t -0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.005
-4.99 0.17 1.40 0.22 -0.10 -3.62
Liquidity ratio t -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
-4.48 -4.68 -3.25 -3.23 -2.39 -3.99
t-1 -0.002
-4.81
Constant -2.153 -2.085 -2.130 -1.951 -1.756 -2.092 -2.083
-20.17 -17.31 -14.28 -10.88 -14.92 -16.90 -17.32
Number of observations 71 058 46 608 30 924 19 831 12 139 45 335 46 608
Number of firms 24 668 17 169 12 135 8 623 7 346 16 662 17 169
Pseudo-R
2 0.046 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.023 0.052 0.038
Wald Chi
2 347.0 196.4 119.0 65.4 55.7 250.2 196.2
Prob > Chi
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.396 0.357 0.347 0.244 0.000 0.362 0.358
Prob >= chibar
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00 0.00Financial Stability Report 2006 | Banco de Por  tu  gal
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Table 5












Model1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Sales growth -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-2.67 -2.20 -2.12 -2.14 -2.21 -2.33 -2.18 -2.21 -0.72
ROA -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
-4.30 -3.95 -3.93 -3.96 -3.90 -4.16 -3.94 -3.94 -1.63
Solvency ratio -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
-7.06 -7.35 -7.37 -7.35 -7.34 -7.23 -7.37 -7.32 -3.08
Investment rate -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
-5.35 -4.99 -4.99 -4.99 -4.91 -5.25 -4.97 -4.95 -2.45
Liquidity ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
-4.52 -4.48 -4.46 -4.47 -4.50 -4.44 -4.49 -4.49 -4.28
Interest rate on loans to firms 0.026
2.26
Yield curve slope (10 y - 3 m) -0.159
-3.43
Loan growth -0.023 -0.019
-8.34 -6.02
PSI Geral variation -0.002 -0.002
-4.86 -3.48
GDP growth rate -0.087 -0.141
-7.54 -6.47
Coincident indicator of economic
activity -0.061 -0.075
-7.14 -7.07
Sales growth * GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
ROA* GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.16
Solvency ratio* GDP growth rate 0.000
-0.35
Investment rate * GDP growth rate 0.000
0.26












Constant -2.241 -2.153 -2.093 -2.192 -1.872 -2.274 -1.755 -2.321 -1.935
-23.26 -20.17 -20.38 -21.40 -17.64 -22.45 -14.57 -19.71 -16.78
Number of observations 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058 71 058
Number of firms 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668 24 668
Pseudo-R
2 0.037 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.044 0.040 0.045 0.043 0.044
Wald Chi
2 333.8 347.0 330.3 327.3 345.7 323.3 344.3 338.3 336.2
Prob > Chi
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
rho 0.336 0.396 0.393 0.392 0.384 0.371 0.395 0.383 0.395
Prob >= chibar
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: z-scores in ital ics. All re gres sions in clude the con trol dum mies for size and sec tor pre sented in Ta ble 3. All mod els es ti mated us ing a ran dom-ef fects probit es ti ma tor, where the de -
pend ent vari able is the dummy credit over due. Co ef fi cients re fer to mar ginal ef fects. The pseudo-R2 is a mea sure of the good ness of the fit. The Wald test eval u ates the over all sta tis ti cal
sig  nif  i  cance of the es  ti  mated co  ef  fi  cients. Fi  nally, rho as  sesses the pro  por  tion of the to  tal vari  ance re  sult  ing from the panel-level variance component.co in ci dent  eco nomic  ac tiv ity  in di ca tor  (with  a  neg a tive  con tem po ra ne ous  im pact  on  de fault  prob a bil i -
ties, in agree  ment with what would be ex  pected), loan growth (which also dis  plays a neg  a  tive co  ef  fi  -
cient), the in  ter  est rate on loans to firms (with a pos  i  tive co  ef  fi  cient, as ex  pected), and the change in
stock mar ket prices (im ply  ing that pos  i  tive de vel  op  ments in stock mar  ket prices seem to be as  so  ci  ated 
with lower de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties). Given that firms’ fi  nan  cial ra  tios are also sub  ject to size  able fluc  tu  a  -
tions over the busi  ness cy  cle, we tried to ex  plic  itly model these co-move  ments by add  ing to the model
in ter ac tions be tween firm-spe cific vari ables and the GDP growth rate. Re sults sug gest that these in ter -
ac tions  are  not  par tic u larly  sig nif i cant  in  de ter min ing  de fault  prob a bil i ties  (only  the  in ter ac tion  be tween
the li  quid  ity in  di  ca  tor and the GDP growth rate is sig  nif  i  cant). In gen  eral, mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  ables
shown in Ta  ble 5 have a con  sid  er  able ex  plan  a  tory power, with rel  a  tively strong marginal effects on
default probabilities. Furthermore, the inclusion of control variables for time effects or macroeconomic
variables significantly improves the model’s goodness of fit.
6. MAIN ECONOMETRIC RESULTS OBTAINED USING DURATION MODELS
The ap  pli  ca  tion of du  ra  tion mod  els to our re  search helps to un  der  stand not only why do firms de  fault,
but also when is de  fault more likely to oc  cur. In or  der to es  ti  mate that, we take into ac  count in  for  ma  tion
on the firm’s sur vival since its cre  ation date. How  ever, the da ta  base used in this re  search only in  cludes 
data from 1996 on  wards, orig  i  nat  ing sig  nif  i  cant left-cen  sor  ing prob  lems. This prob  lem can be partly
ac  counted for by de  clar  ing that firms are con  sid  ered to be at risk since their cre  ation date, though that
fail  ure risk can be ob  serv  able only af  ter the firm en  ters the sam  ple (which may even  tu  ally be af  ter
1996). This in  for ma  tion is taken into ac count in the es  ti  ma  tion of the re  gres  sions. Al  ter na  tively, in or der 
to fully elim  i  nate left-cen  sor  ing, some es  ti  ma  tions only con  sid  ered firms cre  ated af  ter 1996. How  ever,
in this case we are ana  lys  ing a very spe  cific group of newly cre  ated firms, which may show credit risk
de  ter  mi  nants very dif  fer  ent from those of the re  main  ing firms. In gen  eral, these firms have, on av  er  -
age, higher in  vest  ment rates and in  debt  ed  ness levels, which is con  sis  tent with their life phase. Chart 2
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Chart 2

































































COX REGRESSIONS (HAZARD RATIOS)
Full sample New firms
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
Sales growth 0.998 1.003
-1.72 1.54
ROA 0.995 0.994 0.994 0.992 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.993 0.992 0.992 0.993 0.992
-4.33 -4.83 -4.84 -2.44 -2.31 -2.31 -2.02 -1.79 -2.36 -2.37 -2.17 -2.49
Solvency ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 1.003 1.003 1.003 1.000 1.005 1.003 1.002 1.003
-4.59 -4.56 -4.53 0.74 0.78 0.74 -0.06 1.29 0.70 0.59 0.77
Investment rate 0.990 0.989 0.989 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.993 0.994 0.994 0.994 0.994
-3.94 -4.10 -4.12 -1.23 -1.02 -1.02 -1.00 -1.47 -1.04 -1.04 -1.08 -1.02
Liquidity ratio 0.995 0.995 0.995 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.990 0.993 0.986 0.990 0.990 0.990
-4.53 -4.51 -4.54 -3.94 -4.04 -4.04 -3.89 -2.97 -5.01 -3.99 -3.97 -3.98
Leverage 0.997
-0.78




Available collateral (approx.) 0.994
-1.32
Firm established since 1996 (Y/N) 0.962
-0.23




PSI Geral variation 1.005
0.98
Constant --- ---------
Number of observations 76 292 76 292 76 292 3 847 3 847 3 847 3 802 3 847 3 802 3 847 3 847 3 847
Number of firms 25 690 25 690 25 690 2 324 2 324 2 324 2 297 2 324 2 297 2 324 2 324 2 324
Number of failures 1 000 1 000 1 000 68 68 68 67 68 67 68 68 68
Time at risk 76 292 76 292 76 292 3 847 3 847 3 847 3 802 3 847 3 802 3 847 3 847 3 847
Wald chi
2 583.9 581.4 577.9 35.7 34.2 34.2 35.2 39.9 44.8 31.5 31.0 31.3
Prob > chi
2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: z-scores in italics. New firms include all firms established since 1996. Regressions for the full sample include the control dummies for size, sector and year presented in Table 3. All models estimated using a Cox regression which evaluates the time until default, using robust variance estimates. A coefficient lower than 1
should be interpreted as contributing to an increase in time until default eventually occurs. The Wald test evaluates the overall statistical significance of the estimated coefficients.pres  ents haz  ard func  tions for this group of firms, show  ing that their de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties in  crease up to
the 4
th year of the firm, grad  u  ally de  clin  ing there  af  ter.
13
Within the frame  work of du  ra  tion mod  el  ling, we es  ti  mated sev  eral re  gres  sion mod  els, in a spirit sim  i  lar
to that of dis  crete choice mod  els. The re  sults ob  tained are broadly con  sis  tent with those ob  tained with
probit mod  els: firms with higher prof it  abil  ity, higher sol  vency, higher in vest ment rates, and better li quid  -
ity ra  tios should take a lon  ger time to even  tu  ally de  fault on their loan com  mit  ments (Ta  ble 6). How  ever,
sales growth turns out to be clearly non-sig  nif  i  cant in these mod  els. Hence, though sales growth may
con trib ute to ex plain why some firms de fault, it does not seem to de ter mine the time un til de fault. Given 
the strong left-cen  sor  ing in the da  ta  base, we also tested whether firms cre  ated from 1996 on  wards
were sub  stan  tially dif  fer  ent from oth  ers. In or  der to achieve that, we es  ti  mated a model in  clud  ing a
dummy vari  able for such firms (model 3 in Ta  ble 6). This dummy vari  able is far from be  ing sig  nif  i  cant,
sug  gest  ing that these firms do not sub  stan  tially dif  fer from the re  main  ing firms in the sample, after
controlling for a set of firm’s financial characteristics.
How  ever, the only way to to  tally elim  i  nate left-cen  sor  ing in the sam  ple is to ex  clude all firms that have
not been ob  served since their cre  ation date, es  ti  mat ing re  gres  sions only for the sub-group of firms cre  -
ated af  ter 1996. The re  sults of these es  ti ma  tions are also shown in Ta  ble 6. In gen eral, the sol  vency ra  -
tio  and  the  in vest ment  rate  are  no  lon ger  sta tis ti cally  sig nif i cant,  sug gest ing  that  de fault  prob a bil i ties
for start-up firms may have slightly dif  fer  ent de  ter  mi  nants than those of more ma  ture firms. Sev  eral al  -
ter na tive  spec i fi ca tions  were  con sid ered,  in clud ing  the  in tro duc tion  of  mac ro eco nomic  vari ables.  Most
of the vari  ables tested do not seem to be sta  tis  ti  cally sig  nif  i  cant in the de  ter  mi  na  tion of the time un  til
de  fault of these start-up firms. The only rel  e  vant ex cep tion seems to be the turn over ra tio. Ac cord ing to 
the re  sults ob  tained with these re  gres  sions, firms with lower turn  over ra  tios should default sooner than
other firms. None of the macroeconomic variables tested is significant.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The re  sults ob  tained in the lit  er  a  ture sug  gest that in pe  ri  ods of strong eco  nomic growth, which are
some  times ac  com  pa  nied by strong credit growth, there may be some ten  dency to  wards ex  ces  sive
risk-tak  ing, amid some mar  ket op  ti  mism. Cu  mu  la  tive im  bal  ances cre  ated in such pe  ri  ods will tend to
be  come ap  par  ent only when eco  nomic ac  tiv  ity slows down mark  edly. Against this back  ground, this ar  -
ti cle  ex am ines  the  de ter mi nants  of  credit  risk,  tak ing  into  ac count  firm-spe cific  id io syn cratic  fac tors,  as
well as sys  tem  atic fac  tors, which simultaneously affect all economic agents.
For that pur  pose, an ex  ten  sive da  ta  base in  clud  ing fi  nan  cial in  for  ma  tion for more than 30.000 Por  tu  -
guese firms was thor  oughly ana  lysed. The re  sults ob  tained sug  gest that de  fault prob  a  bil  i  ties are af  -
fected  by  sev eral  firm-spe cific  char ac ter is tics,  such  as  their  fi nan cial  struc ture,  prof it abil ity  and
li  quid  ity, as well as by their re  cent sales per  for  mance or their in  vest  ment pol  icy. Af  ter con  trol  ling for the
most  rel e vant  firm  char ac ter is tics,  firm’s  size  does  not  seem  to  sig nif i cantly  af fect  de fault  prob a bil i ties.
How ever,  there  are  con sid er able  dif fer ences  across  eco nomic  sec tors.  Lagged  in for ma tion  on  the
firm’s fi  nan  cial sit  u  a  tion over a short pe  riod also seems to be important in explaining why do some
firms default on their loan commitments.
When time-ef  fect con  trols or mac  ro  eco  nomic vari  ables are taken into ac  count to  gether with the
firm-spe  cific in  for  ma  tion, the re  sults of the mod  els seem to im  prove con  sid  er  ably. Hence, even though
the de  ter  mi  nants of loan de  fault at the mi  cro level are ul  ti  mately driven by the firms’ spe  cific fi  nan  cial
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(13) For a discussion on the determinants of survival probabilities for young firms, see Farinha (2005). The results shown in Chart 2 are very similar to those
obtained in that study.sit u a tion,  there  are  im por tant  re la tion ships  be tween  over all  mac ro eco nomic  con di tions  and  de fault
rates, which should be as  sessed from a financial stability perspective.
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